After attending an off the record briefing, not with an administration official, I heard a way of thinking on Afghanistan that I believe illuminates the new American approach to Afghanistan. To be clear, I have the benefit of others ideas here, but am speaking for myself, credit errors to me and insight to others.
Between the increases earlier this year and the planned 30,000 troop escalation, the Obama administration has dramatically increased the resources going to Afghanistan while making comparatively small adjustments in policy. The approach to rural Afghanistan seems to be shifting from anti-drug efforts to rebuilding the agricultural sector. At the same time, there's talk of working around President Karzai rather than continuing the past policy of flowing all funds through him. Finally while counterinsurgency thinking was not mentioned by name during the speech is being endorsed through population-centric efforts and increasing restraint when it comes to possible civilian casualties.
These changes sound more incremental than revolutionary and no harsh trade-offs were made explicitly. This doesn't mean that more is not going on behind the scenes, but it does seem consistent with the critique of recent Afghan policy that the main problem is that the war was dramatically under resourced. This is certainly accurate, relative to Iraq, when it comes to contract spending and a range of other metrics. On the other hand, critics will note that we are spending more per year than Afghanistan's total GDP, which bespeaks both Afghanistan's remoteness and the expense of military measures in treasure, let alone blood.
So what happens if this view is wrong? If a lack of resources wasn't the main problem or equally likely more resources could well have stabilized the country in the early calm period but are no longer enough. That's where the withdrawal date could come in. There are many caveats to it and strictly speaking we're just supposed to begin the transition to Afghan authority. Even so, I suspect the date will be compelling for our allies and if the situation does not improve may have substantial political support domestically from the President's own party. In essence setting the date puts Afghanistan in the category of a limited war. If the occupation proves unworkable we can dramatically reduce our role even if that means failing to meet key objectives. Looked at another way, there is a level of resources we aren't willing to deploy to "win," the draft is not on the table and the main nation the President is interested in nation building is our own.
It's important to remember that we will see a lag in any results from implementing this new resource level. Sending more people to the country and getting them in action takes time. That said, we can now begin to judge the results of the first troop hike and test the hypothesis that implementation and not strategy is the main problem we face that can be directly controlled from the U.S. end (unlike local corruption).
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